This approach was notable because it implicitly acknowledged that begging was not always a matter of personal choice or moral failure. Instead, it suggested that structural factors—unemployment, lack of education, rural poverty, family breakdown, disability, and migration—played a decisive role. However, the camp also operated within a system that viewed begging as an undesirable and punishable behavior. Participation was not always voluntary; many individuals were collected from the streets by municipal agents and transferred to the camp, blurring the line between social support and coercion.
Half a century later, the legal framework governing begging in Iran reflects a more explicit criminalization. Begging is recognized as a crime under the Islamic Penal Code. According to Article 712, anyone who makes begging or pilfering their profession and earns a living through it shall be sentenced to imprisonment for one to three months. Furthermore, if a person commits such acts despite having financial means, all property acquired through begging may be confiscated in addition to the prison sentence. On paper, the law aims to deter professional begging, prevent exploitation, and protect public order.
Yet the crucial question remains: does such punishment truly have a deterrent effect? To answer this, one must move beyond legal texts and examine the social and economic realities that push individuals toward begging in the first place. Criminal law operates on the assumption of rational choice—that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and refrain from crime when punishment is sufficiently severe or certain. But this assumption often collapses when applied to extreme poverty.
