By the late 1950s, U.S. officials increasingly viewed Mohammad Reza as a more confident and capable ruler. A 1957 U.S. State Department study praised his “growing maturity,” noting that he no longer appeared to seek advice at every turn, as earlier assessments had suggested. For Washington, the Shah seemed to be evolving into a reliable Cold War ally—assertive, anti-communist, and committed to modernization.
Yet this confidence masked deep insecurities. In February 1958, a military coup led by General Valiollah Gharani was uncovered and thwarted. The episode triggered a major crisis in Iranian-American relations when evidence emerged that some of Gharani’s associates had met American diplomats in Athens. Although there was no proof of official U.S. involvement, the Shah interpreted the contacts as evidence of American duplicity.
From that point forward, Mohammad Reza demanded that U.S. officials refrain from meeting his political opponents. Trust between Tehran and Washington, while outwardly intact, had been permanently eroded.
Strategic Anxiety and the Cold War Context
The Shah’s suspicions were compounded by broader strategic concerns. The United States refused to admit Iran into the Baghdad Pact, and military studies suggested that Iran could withstand a Soviet invasion for only a few days. To Mohammad Reza, this reluctance signaled a lack of genuine commitment to Iran’s defense.
